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Abstract  
We analyze optimal social discount rates when people derive utility from relative 
consumption. We compare the social, private, and conventional Ramsey rates. Assuming a 
positive growth rate, we find that 1) the social discount rate exceeds the private discount rate 
if the importance of relative consumption increases with consumption and that 2) the social 
discount rate is smaller than the Ramsey rate given quasi-concavity in own and others’ 
consumption and risk aversion with respect to others’ consumption. Numerical calculations 
demonstrate that the latter difference may be substantial and have important implications for 
long run environmental issues such as global warming. 
 
Keywords: Environmental discounting, global warming, relative consumption, Ramsey rule, 
positionality. 
 
JEL Classification: D63, D90, H43 
  
                                                 

 We are grateful for helpful comments from Thomas Aronsson, Kenneth Arrow, Partha Dasgupta, Martin 
Dufwenberg, Tore Ellingsen, Reyer Gerlagh, Christian Gollier, Geoff Heal, Michael Hoel, Richard Howarth, 
Martin Weitzman and Ronald Wendner, as well as seminar participants at the University of Oslo, University of 
Gothenburg, Resources for the Future in Washington DC, and CESifo (Munich). The research leading to these 
results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under 
grant agreement no [266992]. Financial support is also gratefully acknowledged from the Swedish Research 
Council, the Mistra program Indigo and FORMAS COMMONS. 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The theory and practice of discounting is central to economics (e.g., Arrow and Lind 1970; 
Frederick et al. 2002; and Arrow et al. 1996) and essential for dealing with very long-term 
phenomena. With the increased attention to environmental issues such as climate change, 
interest in discounting has experienced a revival (see Gollier 2010; Gollier and Weitzman 
2010; and Weitzman 2010 for recent contributions). For example, essentially the entire 
economics debate in the wake of the Stern Review (Stern 2006) largely focused on the 
discount rate used—not on climate science or the assessment of costs and benefits of 
mitigation, for which there are still very large uncertainties. (See, e.g., Brekke and Johansson-
Stenman 2008; Dasgupta 2007, 2008; Dietz and Stern 2007; Heal 2008; Howarth 2009; 
Nordhaus 2007a, 2007b; Sterner and Persson 2008; and Weitzman 2007a, 2007b.) The 
primary reason is, of course, that most of the consequences of climate change will occur far 
into the future and thus the discount rate has a dramatic effect on their present value. 
This paper is, as far as we know, the first to incorporate relative consumption effects 
into the theory of social discounting. Yet, the idea that humans value consumption in a social 
context and in relation to others’ consumption is far from new. In fact, classical economists—
such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Alfred Marshall—emphasized such concepts, and 
modern research on the subject dates back at least to Duesenberry (1949). There is now a 
substantial body of empirical evidence suggesting that people not only derive utility from 
their absolute consumption but are also concerned with their own consumption relative to that 
of others.
1
 There is also a growing literature dealing with various kinds of optimal policy 
responses to such relative consumption effects.
2
 For example, Aronson and Johansson-
Stenman (2008; 2010) show, in a static and a dynamic model, respectively, that optimal 
marginal income taxes are likely to be substantially larger under relative consumption effects 
than in a conventional case, where people only care about their absolute consumption level.  
                                                 
1 This includes happiness research (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; and Luttmer 
2005), questionnaire-based experiments (e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002; Solnick and Hemenway 2005; and 
Carlsson et al. 2007), and brain science (e.g., Fliessbach et al. 2007). There are also recent evolutionary models 
consistent with relative consumption concerns (Samuelson 2004 and Rayo and Becker 2007). Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2008) constitute a recent exception in the happiness literature, claiming that the role of relative income 
is overstated. 
2 See, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Oswald (1983), Ng (1987), Brekke and Howarth 
(2002), Abel (2005), and Wendner and Goulder (2008). Clark et al. (2008) provide a good overview of both the 
empirical evidence and economic implications of relative consumption concerns. 
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Arrow and Dasgupta’s paper (2009) is closest to ours, as it explicitly deals with the 
implications of relative consumption effects for intertemporal resource allocation. They show 
that concern for relative consumption does not necessarily lead people to consume more today 
than is socially optimal, since they are also concerned with relative consumption (and hence 
produce positional externalities) in the future; this is also shown in slightly different settings 
by Wendner (2010a, 2011). However, the issue of how discount rates are affected by relative 
consumption effects has not been analyzed before.  
In Section 2, we analyze the question of whether and, if so, how the social discount 
rate (when positional externalities are taken into account) is smaller or larger than the private 
discount rate (when people do not take into account that their consumption affects others—
although they still take into account that they themselves are affected by others’ consumption). 
We show that an important condition derived by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) for when private 
and social consumption paths coincide over time translates to the condition for when the 
private and social discount rates are the same. We then explore the conditions when the social 
discount rate exceeds the private one, and vice versa. We express these conditions in terms of 
the degree of positionality, a measure reflecting the extent to which relative consumption 
matters. For a positive growth rate, we show that if the degree of positionality increases with 
the consumption levels, consistent with some empirical evidence, then the social discount rate 
exceeds the private one. We also show that this discrepancy can be internalized by time-
varying consumption taxes. 
In Section 3, we continue by analyzing a related but distinct issue—relevant from a 
climate policy perspective—namely whether, and if so how, the conventional optimal social 
discounting rule, the so-called Ramsey discounting rule (Ramsey 1928), should be modified 
in the presence of relative consumption effects.
3
 The conventional Ramsey discounting rule 
says that the optimal discount rate equals the pure rate of time preference plus the product of 
the individual degree of relative risk aversion multiplied by the growth rate. Hence, this 
formulation does not take into account that others’ consumption will also change in the future.  
The formula describing the optimal social discount rate in the presence of relative 
consumption effects can be written in a form similar to the Ramsey formula. The only 
difference is that the individual degree of relative risk aversion is replaced by what we denote 
here as the social degree of relative risk aversion. By this we mean a corresponding measure 
                                                 
3  Other papers have dealt with the issue of whether, and if so how, the externalities induced by relative 
consumption effects affect the consumption pattern over time; see e.g. Wendner (2010b) and references therein.  
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of risk aversion had the individual made a risky choice on behalf of his or her whole 
generation. Assuming a positive consumption growth rate, we show that the social discount 
rate is lower than the Ramsey discount rate, if preferences are quasi-concave in own and 
reference consumption (consisting of others’ average consumption) and concave in reference 
consumption. The latter means that individuals prefer that others have a certain consumption 
level compared to the case where others’ consumption is uncertain with the same expected 
value. We show moreover that the social discount rate is higher than the private rate if the 
degree of positionality increases with consumption. Taken together, this implies that the 
social discount rate is higher than the private rate but lower than the Ramsey rate, if the 
degree of positionality increases with consumption and preferences reflect risk aversion with 
respect to reference consumption and are quasi-concave with respect to own and reference 
consumption. 
Finally, we illustrate quantitatively in Section 4 how the overall long-term social 
discount rates recently suggested by Stern (2006) and Weitzman (2007b) would be modified 
when taking relative consumption effects into account. We conclude that these modifications 
may be substantial with commonly used functional forms and reasonable parameter values, 
and that they are potentially very important for the economics of climate change. Section 5 
offers some final remarks and observations.  
 
2. Private and Social Discount Rates 
 
In this section, we analyze and compare the private and social discount rates between two 
arbitrary points in time, when people care about relative consumption. At the end of this 
section, we also determine the corresponding internalizing consumption taxes. 
 
2.1 Preferences and Objectives 
Following Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), society consists of identical individuals, with a 
population size normalized to one, who, at time t, consume tc  and who, in addition to 
absolute consumption, also care about relative consumption. The latter depends on own 
consumption as well as the reference consumption tz  (the average of others’ consumption), 
such that ( , )t t tR r c z . The individual instantaneous utility (or felicity) at time t is: 
     , , ( , ) ,t t t t t t t tU u c R u c r c z v c z   , (1) 
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where 1 2 1 2 11 11 1 20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0t t t t t t t tu u v v u v r r        ; where sub-indices reflect 
partial derivatives 1 ( , ) /t t t tu u c R c   , etc.; and where u, v, and r are twice continuously 
differentiable.  
 Both the u and v formulations in equation (1) are used extensively in this paper, since 
they allow us to vary which variable is constant, i.e., either relative consumption Rt or others’ 
consumption zt. Throughout the paper, we ignore intra-generational issues and assume the 
same uniform and normalized population in each period. Moreover, we let r satisfy the 
criterion that it is unaffected if own consumption and others’ consumption are changed 
equally, i.e., 1 2t tr r  . This assumption is fairly innocuous as long as individuals are identical 
within each generation. For example, it encompasses the most commonly used comparison 
forms, i.e., the difference comparison form where 
t t tR c z   (e.g., Akerlof 1997; Ljungqvist 
and Uhlig 2000; Bowles and Park 2005; and Carlsson et al. 2007), the ratio comparison form 
where /t t tR c z , (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Layard 1980; and Wendner and Goulder 
2008), and the more flexible functional form suggested by Dupor and Liu (2003), which 
includes both the difference and the ratio forms as special cases, as long as t tz c  (see below).  
 In addition, we make the common assumption of (weak) keeping-up-with-the-Joneses 
property, such that 12 0tv   (see, e.g., Gali 1994; Carroll et al. 1997; and Wendner 2010a).
4
 
This assumption is made largely for convenience and basically implies that people want to 
consume more when others consume more, and vice versa. It is easy to see that 12 0tv   
implies that identical individuals will have the same consumption in each period, further 
implying that t tz c . In contrast, when 12 0tv  , it may be privately and socially optimal for 
identical individuals to have different consumption patterns over time. Other properties of 
these utility functions will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
Each individual maximizes the flow of instantaneous utility over time, subject to a 
fixed pure rate of time preference—or the utility discount rate  —implying the following 
maximization problem: 
                                                 
4 Dupor and Liu (2003) use a different definition of Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences in a static model 
where utility depends on leisure, in addition to absolute and relative consumption. Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses 
preferences are then naturally defined as preferences implying that an individual’s consumption increases (and 
leisure decreases) when others’ consumption increases, which follows if the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure increases with others’ consumption. 
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   
0 0
max , ( , ) exp( ) , exp( )
T T
pw u c r c z d v c z d
c
    

       
 
. (2) 
Hence, the individual takes others’ consumption tz  as given in each moment in time, 
implying that the individual takes into account that a changed consumption path also implies a 
changed path of relative consumption. The social planner, in contrast, maximizes the flow of 
instantaneous utility for all individuals (and hence also takes into account the externalities 
through relative consumption). As a consequence, since all individuals are identical, the social 
planner takes Rt as given. Thus, the social planner solves the following maximization 
problem: 
   
0 0
max , ( , ) exp( ) , exp( )
T T
sw u c r c c d v c c d
c
             . (3) 
 
2.2 Private and Social Discount Rates 
Consider now a small project undertaken and paid for in terms of reduced consumption at 
time zero that results in increased consumption at time t. Note that since we are only 
concerned with given consumption paths, since we deal with small projects as is common in 
the discounting literature,
5
 our results are independent of any production assumptions, 
including issues of technical change. If the individual is indifferent between undertaking such 
a project and not, the private discount rate per time unit between time zero and t, given by
p , 
is implicitly defined by:  
0
exp( )
p
pt
p
w c
t
w c

 
 
 
. 
Note that this is true for any given consumption path, whether optimal or not. Solving for 
p
gives: 
0
1
( ) ln
p
p t
p
w c
t
t w c

 
 
 
. (4) 
Similarly, if the social planner is indifferent between undertaking such a project and not, the 
social discount rate per time unit between time zero and t, given by
s , is implicitly defined 
by 0 exp( )
s s s
tw c t w c     , implying that: 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Gollier (forthcoming) for a comprehensive state-of-the-art overview of social discounting. 
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0
1
( ) ln
s
s t
s
w c
t
t w c

 
 
 
. (5) 
Next, from equation (2), we have 1 exp( )
p
t tw c v t    , which substituted into equation (4) 
implies: 
1
10
1
( ) lnp t
v
t
t v
   . (6) 
Similarly, we have 1 2( )exp( )
s
t t tw c v v t     , such that: 
1 2
10 20
1
( ) lns t t
v v
t
t v v
 

 

. (7) 
Comparing equations (6) and (7) immediately implies the following result: 
  
Proposition 1.  ( ) ( )
s pt t t    , if and only if 2 1( ) ( )t t t t tv c v c c   , where  is a constant. 
 
Proposition 1 says that the social and private discount rates are equal between all time 
periods, if and only if the ratio between the marginal disutility of others’ consumption and the 
marginal utility of own consumption is constant. As such, it resembles Proposition 1 in Arrow 
and Dasgupta (2009), which says—based on a similar but slightly different model—that the 
privately and socially optimal consumption paths coincide, if and only if, for all t, 2 1t tv v .  
In order to explore the differences between the social and private discount rates in a 
way that allows for a straightforward economic interpretation, we introduce a measure 
(following, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002 and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 2008) 
that reflects the extent to which relative consumption matters.  
 
Definition 1.   The degree of positionality is defined by: 
2 1
1 2 1
t t
t
t t t
u r
u u r
 

. (8) 
 
Thus, (0,1t   reflects the fraction of the overall utility increase from the last dollar 
consumed that is due to increased relative consumption. As t  approaches zero, relative 
consumption at time t does not matter at all at the margin, taking us back to the standard 
model. In the other extreme case, where t  approaches one, absolute consumption does not 
matter at all (i.e., all that matters is relative consumption).  
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From equation (1), we have that 2 2 2t t tv u r  and 1 1 2 1t t t tv u u r  , together implying 
that:  
2 2
1 1
t t
t t
t t
v r
v r
     . (9) 
Substituting equation (9) into equation (7) gives, after some straightforward manipulations,  
 1 1 10
10 10 20 10 0
11 1
( ) ln ln
1
s t t t t
t
v v v
t
t v v v t v

    

   
        
    
, (10) 
implying that the social discount rate increases in the positionality difference  0t  .  
 Combining equations (6) and (10), and denoting the instantaneous growth rate at time 
t /t t tg c c , where a dot denotes time derivative, immediately gives us the following result: 
 
Proposition 2.   For 0tg t  , ( ) ( ) ( )
s pt t t    , if and only if ( ) 0t tc t     . 
 
Proof:  If 0t tc t     and 
0tg t  , then 0t  , and by comparing equation (6) and 
equation (10), ( ) ( )
s pt t t   . Similarly, if ( ) ( )s pt t t   , then 0t t   . Since 
equations (6) and (10) hold, regardless of the initial time 0, 0t tc t    . The proof for the 
case where 0t tc t     is analogous. The case of 0t tc t     follows directly from 
Proposition 1, where t t   .  
 
In other words, if relative consumption becomes more important (compared to absolute 
consumption) when consumption increases, then the social discount rate is larger than the 
private one. The intuition is straightforward: When relative consumption becomes more 
important for higher consumption levels, a larger share of overall consumption increases is 
“waste” in terms of positional externalities; and since consumption increases over time, this 
waste share increases over time too. This implies that future consumption becomes less 
valuable, compared to the present one, from a social point of view, and compared to the case 
where this waste is not taken into account. Specifically, the social discount rate is higher than 
the private one. 
The empirical evidence, although not conclusive, indeed seems to suggest that 
0t tc   , such that relative consumption becomes more important compared to absolute 
consumption when the individuals get richer (see, e.g., Clark et al. 2008 and Corazzini, 
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Esposito and Majorano in press and references therein).
6
 This implies that, based on the 
present model, we may conclude that the social discount rate tends to exceed the private one 
under relative consumption effects.   
 
 
2.3 Optimal Consumption Taxes 
Although not the main purpose of the paper, it is worth mentioning that we can derive the set 
of consumption taxes that would internalize the time-dependent positional externalities. Let us 
assume a set of consumption taxes, such that tq  is the consumption tax at time t, where we 
normalize such that 0 0q  , and where the tax revenues are distributed back in a lump-sum 
manner. We can then simply derive tq  as follows: If the individual is indifferent between 
undertaking and not undertaking a small project that will result in increased consumption at 
time t—which is paid for in terms of reduced consumption at time zero, and where 
consumption at time zero is untaxed and at time t is taxed by 
tq —then the private discount 
rate per time unit is implicitly defined by:  
0
(1 )exp( )
p
pt
tp
w c
q t
w c

 
  
 
,  
implying that: 
1
10
1 1
ln
1
p t
t
v
t v q
 
 
   
 
, 
where 1
10
1
1
t
t
v
v q
 reflects the ratio of the marginal utility of own consumption, per monetary 
unit spent on consumption, between time t and time zero. If we set this private discount rate 
equal to the social one, given by equation (10), then:  
0
1
t
t
t
q
 




. (11) 
Thus, the tax is directly related to the difference in consumption positionality at time t, 
compared to the untaxed baseline at time zero. The intuition is straightforward, since t  is 
also a measure of social waste associated with consumption at time t. (Cf. with the 
                                                 
6 However, see Moav and Neeman (2012) for theoretical work showing that situations may arise where poor 
people are particularly positional, supported with some empirical evidence, which may contribute to a so-called 
poverty trap. 
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corresponding static optimal tax results in Dupor and Liu 2003 and Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman 2008.)  
 
3. Comparisons with the Conventional Ramsey Discounting Rule 
 
In the previous section, we analyzed the conditions for when the social discount rate is lower 
or higher than the private one and concluded that the social discount rate exceeds the private 
one when the degree of positionality increases with the consumption level. We based this on a 
simple continuous time model where we discounted over an arbitrary discrete time period, 
from zero to t.  
Yet, much of the discounting literature, including recent work on climate change, is 
based on the Ramsey discount rate, according to which the instantaneous discount rate 
consists of the pure rate of time preference plus the individual coefficient of relative risk 
aversion multiplied by the growth rate. It clearly has great policy relevance to compare the 
optimal social discount rate under relative consumption effects with the Ramsey discounting 
rule, which is the main purpose of this section.  
Since the Ramsey discounting rule is normally derived over an infinitesimally short 
period of time,
7
 here we solely consider instantaneous discount rates (hereafter discount rates). 
We will also compare the private and the social discount rates, as well as the private and the 
Ramsey discount rates, and hence provide conditions for ordering the sizes of the three 
discount rates.
8
 
 
3.1 Three Discount Rates and Three Measures of Relative Risk Aversion 
We will undertake our analysis based on equation (1) (the same underlying instantaneous 
utility function as before), as well as equations (2) and (3) (again the same time-consistent 
objective functions as before), and we will also keep the assumption of identical individuals 
with a population size normalized to one. Note first that, when t approaches zero, we have 
0 ( )
p p p
t tw c w c t w c t           and 0 ( )
s s s
t tw c w c t w c t          . Substituting 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, the formula can be derived over a discrete period of time if one is willing to assume constant 
relative risk aversion preferences, as well as a constant growth rate and pure rate of time preference. Here we do 
not want to limit ourselves to particular functional forms.  
8 For previous studies that have analyzed modifications of the Ramsey discounting rule, see, e.g., Hoel and 
Sterner (2007), Howarth (2009) and Gollier (2010).     
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these into equations (4) and (5), respectively, and applying l’Hôpital’s rule, implies the 
following private and social instantaneous discount rates: 
( )pp t
t p
t
w c t
w c

   
 
 
 (12) 
( )ss t
t s
t
w c t
w c

   
 
 
. (13) 
Thus, pt   and 
s
t reflect the private and social discount rates in the time interval t to t + dt, 
whereas ( )p t  and ( )s t , analyzed in the previous section, reflect these discount rates in the 
discrete time interval from 0 to t.
9
 In order to provide an economic interpretation to the 
comparison between these different instantaneous discount rates, we introduce some useful 
risk aversion definitions. 
 
 
Definition 2. The individual coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:  
11 1/t t t tc v v   . (14)  
The social coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:  
11 1/t t t tc u u   .  (15) 
The coefficient of reference consumption relative risk aversion is given by:  
22 2/t t t tz v v  . (16) 
 
Thus, whereas t  reflects the conventional measure of relative risk aversion (or the 
individual’s elasticity of marginal utility of increased consumption where others’ 
consumption, zt, is held fixed), t  is a measure on the curvature of the instantaneous utility 
function, where relative consumption Rt is held fixed. It can therefore be thought of as a 
measure that reflects risk aversion had the individual made a risky choice on behalf of the 
whole population. Thus, it is the social coefficient of relative risk aversion. Finally, t  is a 
measure of the concavity, and hence risk aversion, with respect to reference consumption. Its 
definition is strictly analogous to the conventional measure of individual relative risk aversion, 
except that it refers to others’ consumption. When 0t  , an individual prefers that others 
                                                 
9 Of course, in the special case where p
t   and 
s
t are both constant in the time interval from 0 to t, then 
( )p ptt    and ( )
p s
tt  . 
12 
 
have consumption ˆtz  with certainty over a situation where others’ consumption is uncertain 
(with the expected value ˆtz ), whereas the individual is indifferent when 0t  .
10
 We can now 
define the conventional instantaneous Ramsey discount rate as follows. 
  
Definition 3. The discount rate according to the Ramsey discounting rule is given by: 
R
t t tg    . (17) 
 
Hence, the Ramsey discount rate simply consists of the pure rate of time preference plus the 
product of the individual coefficient of risk aversion times the growth rate, consistent with 
existing discounting literature.
11
  
 
 
3.2 The Relationship between the Private and the Ramsey Discount Rate  
From equation (2) it follows that 1/
p t
t tw c v e
    and 
 11 12 1( / ) exp( )
p
t t t t t tw c t v c v c v t         , which substituted into equation (12) implies 
the optimal private discount rate as follows:
12
 
11 12
1 1
p t t
t t t t t
t t
v v
c g c g
v v
    . (18) 
By combining equations (17) and (18) and using Definition 3, we obtain:  
 12 12
1 1
p Rt t
t t t t t t t t
t t
v v
g c g c g
v v
        . (19) 
From equation (19) we immediately get the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. For 0tg  , 
p R
t t  . 
                                                 
10 Note that reference consumption risk aversion (
22 0tv  ) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the more 
frequently discussed concept of comparison concavity (
22 0tu  ). See Clark and Oswald (1998) for some 
relationships between comparison-concavity and keeping-up-with-the-Joneses behavior.   
11 Yet, the measure of relative risk aversion will of course depend on the preferences, which here depend also on 
relative consumption.  
12 It is easy to show that the same rule applies for discounting over a discrete time period (in continuous time), 
provided that t and tg  are constant in the interval considered. Recall also that since t tz c  it follows that 
t tz c . 
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Thus, if the growth rate is positive and the preferences are characterized by the keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses property, then the private discount rate falls short of the Ramsey discount 
rate. The intuition is that if my preferences are characterized by the keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses property, then I will perceive future consumption relative to the present one as more 
valuable if others consume more in the future. Yet, this is the same as saying that my private 
discount rate will decrease as others’ consumption grows. 
 
3.3 The Relationship between the Private and the Social Discount Rate 
While we have already analyzed this relationship for the case of discounting over a discrete 
time period, let us for comparison purposes also derive corresponding expressions for the case 
of instantaneous discounting. From equation (3) follows that 1 2( )exp( )
s
t t tw c v v t     , 
such that 
 11 12 21 22 1 2
( )
( ) exp( )
s
t
t t t t t t t t t t
w c
v c v c v c v c v v t
t
 
  
      

,  
which substituted into equation (13) implies the following optimal social discount rate: 
11 12 22 12
1 2 1
2 /
1
s t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
v v v v d dc
c g g c g c g
v v v

   

 
     
 
, (20) 
where, in the second step, we have used 22 21 2 2
11 122 2
1 1 1 1
t t t t t
t t
t t t t t
d v v v v
v v
dc v v v v
  
     
 
. By 
comparing equations (19) and (20), we obtain:
13
 
/
1
s p t t
t t t t
t
d dc
c g

 

 

, (21) 
implying that we can again confirm Proposition 2.  
In order to simplify this expression further, we can define the degree of non-
positionality as: 
1
1 2 1
1 tt t
t t t
u
u u r
   

, (22) 
and the corresponding consumption elasticity of non-positionality as: 
t t
t t
d c
dc


  . (23) 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, one could have derived this expression by letting t go to zero in equation (7) and applying 
l’Hôpital’s rule on the second term.  
14 
 
The degree of non-positionality is hence defined by the fraction of the overall utility increase 
from the last dollar consumed that is due to increased absolute consumption, whereas the 
consumption elasticity of non-positionality can be interpreted as (approximately) the 
percentage change in non-positionality that arises from a percentage consumption increase. 
We can then use equation (23) and rewrite equations (20) and (21) as: 
12
1
s pt
t t t t t t t t t t
t
v
g c g g g
v
         . (24) 
Thus, the social discount rate is equal to the private one minus the consumption elasticity of 
non-positionality times the consumption growth rate. Note that t tg  
reflects the growth rate 
of the fraction of consumption that, from a social point of view, is not waste. If this growth 
rate is positive, it implies a reason for society to consume more in the future, implying a lower 
social discount rate. If it is negative, and more in line with the empirical evidence mentioned, 
then the opposite applies.  
 
3.4 The Relationship between the Social and the Ramsey Discount Rate 
Let us now turn to the most central part of this section, the comparison between the social and 
the Ramsey discount rate. So far, in equation (19) we expressed the relationship between the 
private and the Ramsey discount rate, in terms of a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses measure, and 
in equation (24) we expressed the relationship between the private and the social discount rate, 
in terms of how the degree of positionality depends on the consumption level. By combining 
equations (19) and (24), we can clearly present the relationship between the social and the 
Ramsey discount rate, in terms of a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses measure and how the degree 
of positionality depends on the consumption level, as follows: 
12 12
1 1
/
1
s R Rt t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t
v d dc v
c g c g c g g
v v

  

     

.
 (25)  
Thus, according to this formulation, the social discount rate exceeds the Ramsey discount rate 
if the effects—through increased positionality (or decreased non-positionality) with 
consumption, and hence over time, given a positive growth rate—exceed the keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses effect. Both assumptions are fairly intuitive and, if we accept them, we 
cannot say anything regarding the relative size of st and 
R
t  without adding information 
regarding the relative strengths of these mechanisms. Yet, we will indirectly show conditions 
for when the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses effect dominates the increasing positionality effect. 
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In doing this, let us use the alternative formulation of equation (3), where sw  is 
expressed in terms of the u function. It then follows that 1/ exp( )t tw c u t    and 
 11 1( / ) exp( )t t t tw c t u c u t        , which substituted into equation (12) implies the 
following alternative formulation of the optimal social discount rate: 
s
t t tg    . (26) 
By comparing equations (17) and (26), we immediately have: 
 
Proposition 4.  For 0tg  , ( )
s R
t t    if and only if ( )t t   . 
 
In words, given a positive growth rate, the welfare-maximizing social discount rate in the 
presence of relative consumption effects exceeds the conventional Ramsey discount rate if the 
social coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds the individual coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, and vice versa.  
The next question is obvious. Under which conditions does t  exceed t , and vice 
versa? In order to interpret the conditions for this in economic terms, we introduce a measure 
of the complementarity between own and (reduction of) others´ consumption. 
 
 
Definition 4. The elasticity of substitution between tc  and tz  is given by:  
11 22 12
2 2
1 2 1 2 11 22 12 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
2
2
1 1
t t t
t t t t t t t t t
t t
t t t t t t
t t t t
v v v
v v v v v v v v v
c
v v v v v v
v c v z
  
 
      
 
. (27) 
 
This definition is standard (although it is not often used between one good and one bad in the 
utility function). It reflects the degree of quasi-concavity of v, and hence the degree of 
convexity of the indifference curves in ,t tc z space. When 0t  everywhere, an individual 
who could hypothetically buy a reduction in others’ consumption at a fixed per unit price 
would then face a unique optimum, whereas 0t   everywhere would give linear 
indifference curves, such that the increase in consumption necessary to compensate an 
individual for other people’s increase in consumption would be constant. We can now specify 
the following crucial relation between t  and t : 
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Lemma 1. The social coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by: 
t t t t     . (28) 
 
Proof:  Let us first express the social coefficient of relative risk aversion t  in terms of the v 
function. By comparing equations (18) and (23), we have:  
 
11 12 22
1 2
2t t t
t t
t t
v v v
c
v v

 
 

 .     (29) 
We can now combine equations (14) and (27) and (after some straightforward algebraic 
manipulations) obtain: 
 
22 1 2 11 22 12
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2t t t t t tt t t t
t t t t t t t
v v v v v v
c c
v v v v v v v
 
 
       
  
.  (30) 
Substituting, finally, equations (16) and (27) into equation (30) gives equation (28).  
 
Directly from Lemma 1 and equation (10), we can specify the social discount rate in terms of 
individual risk aversion as follows:  
   s Rt t t t t t t t tg g             .   (31) 
It is the straightforward to determine the conditions for when the social discount rate exceeds 
the one based on the conventional Ramsey discounting rule, and vice versa: 
 
Proposition 5. For 0tg  , ( )
s R
t t    if ( ) 0t t    .  
 
Thus, a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for s Rt t   is that v is strictly quasi-concave 
( 0)t  and individuals are weakly reference-consumption risk averse 22( 0, 0)t tv    or, 
alternatively, that v is weakly quasi-concave ( 0)t  and individuals are strictly reference-
consumption risk averse 22( 0, 0)t tv   . 
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that reference-consumption risk aversion and 
quasi-concavity both contribute to a decrease in the social marginal utility of consumption 
when consumption increases. Yet, at the same time, they contribute to a decrease in the 
percentage change in social marginal utility of consumption for a percentage increase in 
consumption.  
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In order to gain some further insights, let us consider some special cases where we 
deal with reference-consumption risk aversion and quasi-concavity separately. Starting with 
the case of reference-consumption risk aversion (i.e., that 22 0tv  ) and perfect substitution  
(i.e., linear indifference curves, such that 0t  ), we can write instantaneous utility as
   (1 ) ( )t t t t tf c az f a c a c z     , where 0 1a   reflects the degree of positionality and 
' 0f   and '' 0f  . Then, 1 'tv f , 11 ''tv f , 1 (1 ) 'tu a f  , and 
2
11 (1 ) ''tu a f  , implying 
that ''/ 't tc f f   and (1 ) ''/ 't ta c f f    , such that ''/ ' 0t t tac f f    , and hence 
s R
t t  .  
The reason is simply that when a increases, the curvature of u decreases. When a 
approaches 1, such that only relative consumption matters, both 1tu  and 11tu  approach zero, 
but 11tu approaches zero more rapidly. A 1 percent change in a subset of consumption 
(consumption minus the effect of reference consumption) will cause a smaller than 1 percent 
change in consumption, per se. Hence, the corresponding changes in marginal instantaneous 
social utility will be smaller too.  
Consider next the case with quasi-concavity and reference consumption risk neutrality, 
such that 0t   and 22 0t tv   . A simple functional form that fulfills this is 
1 1/ (1 ) / (1 ) (1 ) ( )t t t t t tc z c c c z
              , where , 0    and 
1
1
1
tc


 

 
to ensure quasi-concavity.   is the individual coefficient of relative risk aversion, such that 
t  , and the degree of positionality increases with  , but is not constant.  
It then follows that 1 (1 )t tu c
     and 111t tu c
    , implying that 
1 (1 )
t
tc





 
 and 
1
(1 )
0
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
t
t t
t t
c
c c

 
 
  
   

     
   
. Hence, again,
s R
t t  . Here there is no direct effect on the curvature from z, since we have reference-
consumption risk neutrality, yet z will still affect the curvature of the instantaneous utility 
function differently depending on whether relative consumption or others’ consumption is 
held fixed.  
However, it should be noted that the condition in equation (31) is not independent of 
equation (25). Indeed, we can directly show that  12
1
/
1
t t t
t t t t t
t t
d dc v
c c
v



    

, clearly 
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implying that if 0t t   , then 
12
1
/
1
t t t
t t t t
t t
d dc v
c g c g
v




. Thus, if v is quasi-concave and 
individuals are reference-consumption risk averse, then the effects through increased 
positionality over time in equation (31) cannot exceed the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses effect. 
 
3.5 Summary of Main Findings 
By combining equation (20) and Proposition 5, we can summarize our main findings in this 
section regarding the ordering of our three different discount rates as follows:
14
 
 
Corollary 1.  For 0tg  , if / 0t td dc  and 0t t   , then
p s R
t t t    .  
 
Spelled out, this means that, for a positive consumption growth rate, the social discount rate is 
higher than the private rate, but smaller than the Ramsey rate, if the degree of positionality 
increases with consumption and preferences reflect risk aversion with respect to reference 
consumption and are quasi-concave with respect to own and reference consumption.  
 
4. Numerical Illustration and Orders of Magnitude 
 
So far we have concluded that, under what may seem to be fairly plausible assumptions, the 
social discount rate tends to exceed the private discount rate (Sections 2 and 3), but fall short 
of the conventional Ramsey discounting rule (Section 3). The latter finding is particularly 
important from a policy perspective, for example in the discussion on climate change.  
To get an indication of the magnitude of the effects found, we utilize the following 
simple, albeit quite flexible, functional form characterized by constant elasticity of 
substitution and constant relative risk aversion, similar to one used by Dupor and Liu (2003) 
as follows:  
    
1 1
1 1 1 1 11 1
1 1
(1 )
1 1
t t t t t tU a c a c z c az
 
     
 
 
          
 
 . (32) 
This functional form has some convenient properties: 
 The degree of positionality (see Definition 1) is constant and given by t a  . 
                                                 
14
 Note that if the conditions in Corollary 1 are fulfilled, then it also follows that 
12 0tv  , i.e., the keeping-up-
with-the-Joneses property is fulfilled. 
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 The elasticity of substitution between own consumption and reference 
consumption (see Definition 4) is constant and equal to  .  
 The coefficient of reference-consumption relative risk aversion (see Definition 2) 
is constant and given by 
1
t
a
a
 




, implying reference-consumption risk 
aversion for a  .  
 The individual and the social coefficients of relative risk aversion (see Definition 
2) are also constant and given by 
1
t
a
a
 




 and t  , respectively, implying 
that: 
 
 
1
t t
a
a
     

,  (33) 
which is clearly weakly negative (such that s Rt t  ) as long as   , which is 
required for the weak keeping-up-with-the-Joneses property assumed.  
 
The constant elasticity of substitution functional form in equation (32) includes as special 
cases the two most commonly used comparison-consumption functional forms. When 0  , 
we obtain the following simple difference comparison form, so that own consumption and 
(the negative of) others’ consumption are perfect substitutes: 
    
(1 ) (1 )1 1
(1 )
1 1
t t t t t tU a c a c z c az
 
 
 
     
  .
 (34) 
For this functional form, we find that 0
1
t t
a
a
     

. For example, if 0.5a   and 
1  , then  1t t    , implying that the private coefficient of relative risk aversion 2t  , 
whereas the corresponding social coefficient 1t  . Hence, it is clear that the effects of 
relative consumption may be substantial.  
Similarly, we obtain the ratio-comparison form by letting   approach unity and 
applying l’Hôpital’s rule, implying that equation (32) converges to: 
(1 )
/(1 )
(1 )/(1 ) (1 ) /(1 )1 1
1 1
a a
a a at
t t t t
t
c
U c c z
z

 
 


    
  
   
    
, (35) 
such that (1 )
1
t t
a
a
    

, which is clearly negative if 1   and positive if 1  . Note 
that reference-consumption risk aversion implies that 1/ a  , and the keeping-up-with-the-
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Joneses assumption implies that 1  . Here, too, it is clear that the effects of relative 
consumption may be substantial as we illustrate further below. In order to assess orders of 
magnitude of the effects on the discount rates, we substitute equation (33) into equation (25) 
and obtain that 
 
1
s
t
a
g
a
    
 
    
 
. (36) 
In Figure 1, we plot the optimal social discount rate as a function of the degree of 
positionality for two commonly discussed sets of assumptions in the economic climate change 
literature, associated with Stern (2006) and Weitzman (2007b), respectively. Stern (2006) 
assumed that 0.1  (in percentage terms), 1  , and 1.3g  , implying an overall Ramsey 
discount rate of 1.4 percent annually,
15
 whereas Weitzman (2007b) discusses the case where 
2g    , 16  leading to a Ramsey discount rate of 6 percent. Since both Stern and 
Weitzman conventionally assumed that relative consumption does not matter for utility, the 
corresponding social discount rates can be found to the left in the diagram where a = 0. As 
can be seen, how much relative consumption concerns affect the optimal social discount rate 
will then depend also on the elasticity of substitution,  . We only plot the relationships for 
the case where the weak keeping-up-with-the-Joneses property is fulfilled, i.e. where   , 
implying in the Stern case that 1  and in the Weitzman case that 2  . As can be seen, the 
optimal social discount rate is always equal to or below the Ramsey discount rate.  
We illustrate the parts of the relationships where the individual is reference-
consumption risk averse
17
 with solid lines, and the parts where the individual is reference-
consumption risk-loving with dotted lines. Clearly, for non-negligible levels of a, the optimal 
discount rate tends to be substantially smaller than the Ramsey rate if we assume reference-
consumption risk aversion.  
 
                                                 
15  It may seem that Stern selected these values partly to compensate for a number of simplifications and 
omissions. Stern (2006) mentioned combinations of ethical, distributional issues, and deep uncertainty, as well as 
the effects of different growth rates in different sectors. Relative consumption issues were not mentioned, 
however. 
16 In personal communication, Weitzman recently told us he would personally favor a near-zero rate of pure time 
preference for climate change, and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2.5 or 3 rather than 2. Yet, he still 
agrees that the 2-2-2 rule, which was originally introduced more as a thought experiment, is still relevant since it 
is widely used by others in the climate change literature. 
17 It is easy to show that the individual is reference consumption risk averse if and only if           . 
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Figure 1.     The Effect of the Degree of Postionality a on the Optimal Social Discount Rates Associated with 
the Assumptions in Stern (2006) and Weitzman (2007b). 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, the empirical literature does not provide any precise estimates of the relevant 
parameters. The most central one,   (or a), is obviously difficult to measure, and it is 
therefore not surprising that the available estimates vary considerably. However, most 
estimates are substantially above zero. According to the survey-experimental evidence of 
Solnick and Hemenway (1998; 2005), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Alpízar et al. (2005), 
and Carlsson et al. (2007), the average degree appears to be in the order of magnitude of 0.5. 
Wendner and Goulder (2008) argued, based on existing empirical evidence, for a value 
between 0.2 and 0.4, whereas evidence from happiness studies, such as Luttmer (2005), 
suggests a much larger value close to unity. To our knowledge, there are no quantitative 
estimates of either   or —i.e., of either reference-consumption risk aversion or the degree 
of quasi-concavity between own consumption and reference consumption—beyond what is 
implied by keeping-up-with-the-Joneses behavior. 
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In contrast, there are many studies trying to estimate  , which is relatively less 
important for the results here.
18
 Estimates of  are highly controversial, in particular for 
ethical reasons, when dealing with intergenerational issues (Stern 2006). Yet, as shown above, 
  does not affect the difference between the social and the Ramsey discount rates. Future 
growth rates are of course also difficult to predict. 
Overall, the discrepancy between the social and the Ramsey discount rates due to 
relative consumption effects is clearly difficult to quantify, but may well be substantial and 
could even exceed 1–2 percentage points in the estimates that are most frequently used in the 
climate literature.  
  
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
There are several reasons based on the existing literature why one may argue that social 
discount rates should in practice be lower than individual ones: individuals are more risk 
averse than society in the presence of uncertainty, and societal time horizons are longer than 
individual ones (cf. Arrow and Lind 1970). In the present paper, we show that relative 
consumption effects do not provide another reason. On the contrary, the social discount rate 
under positional concern tends to exceed the private one, provided that the degree of 
positionality increases as we get richer and consumption increases (for which there is some 
empirical evidence).  
Yet, from a climate policy perspective, it is presumably more important whether the 
optimal social discount rate should be modified compared to the one corresponding to the 
conventional Ramsey discounting rule. We show that for a positive growth rate, the social 
discount rate is lower than the Ramsey discount rate if preferences are quasi-concave in own 
and reference consumption (consisting of others’ average consumption) and concave in 
reference consumption. We also demonstrate numerically that the discrepancies may be 
substantial, although the underlying parameter estimates are highly uncertain. Since the 
impacts of the discount interest rates on the economics of long-term phenomena, such as 
global warming, are so large—even for modest adjustments of the discount rate—it is fair to 
                                                 
18 For example, Friend and Blume (1975) concluded that  generally exceeds unity and is probably greater than 
2. Blundell et al. (1994) and Attanasio and Browning (1995) found, in most of their estimates, an order of 
magnitude of 1 or slightly above, whereas Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) found that   differs between stockholders 
(approximately 2.5–3) and bond holders (approximately 1–1.2). Halek and Eisenbauer (2001) estimated values 
for a large sample of individuals and found a very skewed distribution with a mean over 3, but a median of 0.9. 
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conclude that taking relative consumption effects into account may have a profound effect on 
the economics of phenomena like global warming.    
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